

REVISITING ERIC NORDLINGER: THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIAN CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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This paper examines the role that military has played in the political development of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the modern Russian Federation. By utilizing the theoretical tenets of Eric Nordlinger, this paper endeavors to update and hopefully revise his classic work in civil-military relations, *Soldiers in Politics*. Chapter one of this paper introduces many of the main theoretical concepts utilized in this analysis. Chapter two considers the Stalinist totalitarian penetration model that set the standard for communist governments around the world. Chapter three follows up by addressing the middle years of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Both reformed the military in its relation to the party and state and made the armed forces a more corporate and professional institution. Chapter four pinpoints the drastic changes in both the state and armed forces during Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. The military briefly ventured to a point it never gone before by launching a short coup against the last Soviet president. Chapter five focuses on the last ten years in the Russian Federation. While still a professional organization typical of the liberal model of civil-military relations, the armed forces face great uncertainty, as economic and social problems demand more of their time and resources. Chapter six concludes by speculating on the future of Russian civil-military relations and reconsiders the importance of Nordlinger's elegant yet parsimonious work.

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INTRODUCTION

When Marshall Yazov initiated his quick and bloodless coup against the Soviet President in December 1991, the world witnessed the end of a decades-old model of civil-military relations. This Soviet penetration model, constructed under the rubric of Stalin's totalitarian regime in the 1920s, would survive over sixty years and help build the Soviet Union into one of the world's two great nuclear superpowers. Yet this penetration model as theorized by Eric Nordlinger did not collapse as much as it evolved and died. Nordlinger correctly asserts the early form and function of the penetration model but he does not make a long-term temporal examination of the Soviet civil-military relations model as it changed over time. Despite the fact that the Soviet model was indeed the prototype penetration model and was subsequently mimicked by other states such as the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Soviet model undergoes a gradualistic process of change and evolution. In other words, the military and its relationship with the Communist party alter over time as a result of the needed professionalization of the armed forces in their competition with the West in the Cold War. By the late 1980s, the downturn of the Soviet command economic system forces radical changes in the political leadership in its position vis-à-vis the military. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 goes even further in drastically altering one of the twentieth-century's most respected and powerful military organizations. Even today at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the ten-year old armed

forces of the Russian Federation struggle to maintain their own corporate identity and resources in a time of both economic and political uncertainty. Russia faces a position of inferiority in relation to its former adversaries as well as internal conflict. Just how the armed forces act and react will likely be based largely on past behavior and experience.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EARLY YEARS AND THE PENETRATION MODEL

The Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was the first to utilize what Nordlinger (1977) call a penetration model of civil-military relations. In this model, civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience by "penetrating" the armed forces with political ideas or even fully developed ideologies via the use of political personnel (15). Military officers are intensively imbued with the civilian governors' political ideas and political conformity is rewarded. To maintain control over the military officers' education and supervision, extensive use of surveillance is used. In fact, the adoption of a penetration model is generally limited to regimes where there is a single locus of power but cannot be used effectively where there are competing centers of power (18).

In fact, Nordlinger theoretically conceptualizes a type of political control that is relatively absolute. On the other hand, he also discusses another model of political control, which is far less extreme. This liberal model of civilian control is explicitly premised upon the differentiation of elites according to their expertise and responsibilities (12). Civilians are responsible for and skilled in determining domestic and foreign goals, while military officers are trained and experienced in the managerial and applied utilization of force and for protecting the nation against external attack and the government against civilians. The key emphasis here is that both civilian and military leaders are autonomous in their own spheres even though the military accepts a distinctly subordinate position in overall decision-making to elected civilian leaders.

Nordlinger (1977) makes rather broad distinctions between civilian domination of the military and civilian control over the military. Similarly Huntington (1958) makes a grand differentiation between Western states like the United States and Great Britain which utilize objective control which is analogous to the liberal model and the Soviet Union which utilized a subjective model where political authorities constantly limit military autonomy (56). Yet Herrspring (1999) faults Huntington (and indirectly Nordlinger) for mistakenly projecting Western experiences on the Soviet Union and assuming that relationships he saw in the West must contradict those in the East.

In fact, the early years of the Soviet Army were marked by heavy supervision and suspicion as a result of the recent end of the Russian Civil War (1917-1923) (1977 Perlmutter 78). Initially the Bolshevik leadership led by Trotsky used dual control and political commissars to supervise formerly Tsarist army officers. Yet 1926 gave one hundred percent of corps commanders and fifty-five percent of division commanders given greater unit autonomy (Herrspring 1999). Chief of Staff Frunze had reduced the Red Commander commissar roles and allowed both political and military officers to work together to improve unit performance (567). Political commissars, who were appointed party officials, endeavored to change political and social value systems, control the behavior of line officers; build support for the goals propounded by the party and motivate the troops for combat (558). Political officers, who frequented army units more often in the late 1920s, did not concern themselves with changing value systems or controlling line officers as much. He served more as a line officer and less of a political

watchdog (558). Finally reform efforts also saw a reduction in the size of the Red Army and a reorganization of doctrine and line leadership along with the establishment of military academies and schools to teach military science (1992 Currie 185-186). Thus the first decade of the Soviet military demonstrated an inconsistent application of civilian control of the armed forces. What was at first rigorous penetration-like control lessened as the tumult of the civil war and First World War passed. The army's early subjective control became more objective and it attempted to focus more on institutional priorities with its first efforts at reform.

The Great Purges and Stalin's Terror

By the end of the 1920s, the Communist Party had become a powerful and complex state bureaucracy. The army, despite its recently won semi-autonomy, was still harnessed to the leadership, which had constant political oversight. Joseph Stalin had recently consolidated his own political power within the party and sought to eliminate any threats from the army. He revived the usage of the commissar system as a way to eliminate possible resistance to his control. From 1933-1938, some thirty-percent or 30,000 of the officer corps were killed (1977 Perlmuter 79). Stalin used the ideology of party dictatorship to justify the purges. He also humiliated, repressed and derogated many remaining officers in an attempt to discourage any notions of reprisals or mobilization against the party (1982 Kolkovicz 244).

Yet recent archival data studying the dispositions of military officers reflects that about ten percent of the convictions were "justified", hinting perhaps that a plot against

Stalin did exist (1996 Thurston 123). In fact, some twenty-four thousand air force officers originally thought executed were in fact acquitted and even reinstated. Thurston (1996) goes so far as to say that Stalin's purges were likely designed to eliminate actual enemies rather than to instilling general fear into the armed forces (See Table One). In either case, Soviet battle performance while less than competent against the Finns in 1939-1940 did reflect a courage and patriotism despite knowledge of the officer killings. Even early losses against the Germans in 1941 did not indicate a military broken by oppression (Thurston 1996). The Russian Army's resilience notwithstanding, Stalin's Great Purges during the late 1930s represented the peak of Soviet domination of a large military. At the height of the totalitarian experience in 1938-1939, the penetration model had reached a zenith via indoctrination, propaganda, surveillance and actual removal of perceived security threats. As later events would reflect, never again would either party leaders or military officers permit such abuse as the civil-military relationship in the USSR would continue to evolve and change.

TABLE ONE

DISMISSALS FROM THE ARMY (NOT INCLUDING THE AIR FORCE),
1935-39

Year	Number of Dismissals	Reason Given
1935	6198	discharged
1936	5677	discharged
1937	4474	arrested
	11104 "plotters"	discharged for ties to
	15578 (for 1937)	
1938	5032	arrested
	3580	discharged for ties
	4138	discharge due to
	ethnic origin	
	12750 (total for 1938)	
1939	73	arrested
	284	discharged for ties
	357 (total for 1939)	
Total	26685 (for 1937-39)	

From Thurston (1996). PP 122

CHAPTER TWO

THE MIDDLE YEARS AND THE SHIFT TOWARDS PROFESSIONALIZATION

With the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, a change of party leadership would eliminate the formerly oppressive totalitarian scrutiny of the military by the party. The armed forces now found themselves in a new position of potential influence (Kolkowicz 1982). A reshaping of the command structure gave the armed forces new inputs to the political leadership. In fact, Khrushchev was able to oust his rival Malenkov out of leadership contention using the army despite his traditional distrust of the officer corps' intentions (245). The new party secretary promulgated a "new outlook", a mini-reform of sorts which would emphasize cheaper nuclear arms and a smaller standing army (1992 Currie 187, 1977 Perlmutter 80). As a result, the armed forces in general began to follow a direct and indirect declaration of interests and demands from the party (1982 Kolkowicz 124). These demands revolved around three basic issues: 1) priority use of technology, weapons and the use of the economy 2) a mission rationale or a set of foreign and defense policies that assigned a high role to the defense sector by conveying a sense of threat-expectation from outside, and 3) payoffs and concessions such as long-postponed promotions to the higher ranks, rehabilitation of purged officers and former military heroes and promotion of these officers to the Central Committee and other party organs. Interestingly even though the party did indeed grant the armed forces more institutional autonomy, Khrushchev insisted that the war here Marshal Zhukov step down

the leadership. Zhukov was in fact disliked by party members for being too professional and a disciplinarian who disliked political meddling into military affairs (1882 Kolkowicz 245). Apparently the party would lessen its penetrative controls over the army but it did so with some caution. Ironically the party secretary who had benefited from the army's presence in his ascent to power would also be ousted with the help of the army. By 1964, Khrushchev's perceived erratic behavior, concessions to the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis and his insistence on arms reductions and unilateral foreign policy gestures began to irritate senior military leaders. They, along with more conservative party elements, forced him to step down thus allowing a more ideological pro-military, party head, Leonid Brezhnev to take charge. The new party secretary concurred with army leaders on the nature of the needs of the armed forces and permitted senior officers greater participation in security policy-making.

According to Parrott (1990), this new balanced relationship made party officials reluctant to challenge rising defense interests for fear of giving party rivals an opportunity to use such issues as an advantage (46). Whereas Khrushchev often used impulsive snap decisions without consulting senior military officers, Brezhnev preferred a technocratic style based on deference to specialized agencies and the resolution of disagreements through bureaucratic compromise (49). Indeed the middle years Khrushchev-Breznev rule epitomize the major theoretical debate often seen in the study of Soviet civil-military relations concerns just how much conflict and consensus actually exists among government institutions. Kolkowicz (1982) sees the party-military

relationship at the time as essentially zero-sum and conflictual. What the party concedes the army will take and vice-versa. In other words, both institutions competed, often to the detriment of Russian society, for scarce monies and prerogatives. Stalin's totalitarian exercise in the late 1930s was such an example to the party essentially at war with its army. Kolkowicz (1982) later explains that as the military grew and professionalized itself and the Communist party became more bureaucratized, ideology became less important and a more Western interest group relationship arose. Thus the state replaced the party as the main player in relation to the armed forces.

Finally Odom (1978) places the conflict model on its head and derives his institutional congruence or co-optation model which itself is merely a watered-down conflict model. With the Odom model, the state and military see a mutualistic relationship as pragmatic and more often than not, agree with each other on most issues. Finally Colton's (1979) participatory theory seems to split hairs with the other two institutional theories. It subscribes that the military-state relationship is naturally conflict-prone but the conflict is mitigated by compromise. During the post-Stalin era of 1953-1970, the armed forces-state relationship evolved more and more into a more Huntingtonian objective or Nordlinger liberal model, that is, the armed forces became more of an equal but still was subservient to the Soviet state (see Table Two). In fact, like a true interest group the army during the years of 1965-1974 further strengthened its institutional and political influence. It did so by supporting its role in foreign policy priority issues such as China, the Middle East and SALT negotiations (246). By the end

of the Brezhnev era in 1982, the Soviet civil-military relationship had experienced a high point in the military's aggressive growth, institutional strength, corporate autonomy, professional sophistication and political influence (246). In general, the military's dominant interests included a set of conservative social and political views that preferred an orderly society committed to the ideas and objectives of the party. In summary, with the establishment of the bureaucratic/technological model in social and political management, the Soviet military and Communist Party reached accommodation, with the military likely to remain a key actor in maintaining the status quo in foreign policy and defense procurements. Because of this accommodation and the Soviet superpower position, the armed forces earned their place in the dominant coalition of bureaucratic institutions.

By 1974 however, the "accommodationist" Brezhnev was attempting to ameliorate the military influence in Soviet foreign policy and economic planning. His first step was naming the reform-minded Grechko as defense minister. This was an attempt to place more professional, civilian policy-formulators on the Soviet foreign-policy team and Brezhnev's first attempt to prioritize the issue of arms-control (Parrott, 1990). The thought at the time in reformist circles (i.e. arms reduction/détente supporters) was arms-buildups (especially nuclear) did not guarantee peace and Soviet diplomacy and détente with the West had laid a solid political and legal foundation for peaceful cooperation between the superpowers (Parrott, 1990). Brezhnev used these ideals and would begin to emphasize domestic needs over military arms and, in doing so, draw the wrath of military


hard-liners like Ogarkov who distrusted the Reagan Administration. Brezhnev, in fact, utilized the Main Political Administration (MPA), the organ within the armed forces which promotes CPSU control, to weed out hard-line officers and promote officers that followed his reformist party-line. Not only did Brezhnev defend the use of civilian foreign-affairs specialists, he also claimed the party reserved the right to assess the danger of war. He rebuffed hard-line officers by suggesting the officers master and apply the resources given to them and nothing more (Parrott 68). By the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the early 1980s, Russian civil-military relationship had certainly evolved to a point intractable and stable institutionalization. The party had existed for over fifty years and had become far more pluralistic than totalitarian. The armed forces, despite the repression of the 1930s, were back on track to becoming a vast infrastructure of corporate control. Communist ideology by 1985 had become more lip-speak than policy. Ideology had softened so much it had become more of a extraneous practice manual that helped keep the soldiers in the barracks and out of Moscow (229 Colton 1979). The military participated in politics but did not intervene in it in much the same way Western armies influenced their governments. The military had its immediate institutional issues to deal with so as tactics and promotions. Soldiers in fact also at times had direct inputs into certain intermediate areas traditionally considered civilian such as science and technology, agriculture (237-238). Yet the Russian armed forces generally limited their influence on direct policy making except in matters of foreign policy. Soviet officers had no direct incentive to intervene in politics nor did they have a history of doing so. They

also had few ascriptive ties to civil society to encourage more political involvement as happens so often in developing states (250-252). The Soviet government was careful in maintaining materiel benefits to its soldiers with salaries, living conditions and pensions equal to or better than many professions in civilian life (Colton 261-262). Nordlinger (1977) points out how a perceived loss in a military's corporate interests and budgetary support can result in an unhappy officer corps and inevitable intervention (66-70). The Soviet armed forces had constructed an elaborate hierarchy and chain of command system similar to those found in the wealthiest industrial states (See Table Two). The Soviet general staff, originally modeled after the German general staff of the 1900s, maintained personal control over promotions and all who passed through the staff academy (32 Currie 1992). The General staff served as a sort of "brain trust" that fostered growth of the military and its sense of corporate identity. It also championed the cause of military responsibility to the civilian authority and society at large and encouraged the development of even greater expertise (101). What had begun as a pluralist, ragtag "people's army" in 1917 had evolved into a top-to-bottom highly specialized organization with five branches that could destroy any region of the world if so ordered. Typically even though the military tended to circle its wagons against outside government intrusion, it suffered from inter-service rivalries and competition in much the same way its opponent, the United States did. Each of the services fostered their own parochialism and the general staff had to act as a supreme arbiter to continue institutional harmony (Currie 94).


Applying an even closer microanalysis of the armed forces, one can see the ethnic makeup of the officer corps generally reflected people of Slavic heritage and a lower to middle class background (generally Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian peasants) which represented the demographic and geographic mean of the USSR (Colton 261). Again what occurred in the Nigerian coup of 1966 where rival tribes acted out of fear and jealousy would not occur in a more balanced and forcefully integrated union of nations (Nordlinger 41). Finally and perhaps most importantly, the Soviet Union's regime performance and stability factor facilitated a legitimacy inflation in the eyes of army officers (Colton 263). People in Russian society in fact typically admired military officers as being heroes or at least respected them. The Soviet State and the armed forces had mutually compatible objectives and crosscutting interests (279). On the other hand, people in society were not supportive of the Goulart Brazilian government nor did the army approve of his budgeting priorities. These were the two main reasons for the 1964 coup which set up a twenty-year-long military government there (93-96 Nordlinger 1977). Upon examining the main changes that occurred between the years 1953-1985, one sees a definite but gradual shift in the power the Russian military had vis-à-vis the Communist party and finally the Soviet State. Khrushchev used the Army to help consolidate his own power and subsequently made some efforts at reform. By giving the armed forces more leeway into strategic and political decision-making, he foreshadowed his own demise by later alienating Air Force and Strategic Air Forces generals. Brezhnev

was more level-headed and more predictable, two traits authoritarian and conservative institutions greatly appreciate. He would further allow the armed forces to professionalize and develop even greater military and scientific expertise in an effort to compete with the United States in the military and ideological conflict known as the Cold War. Both the Russian military and government had reached a point of corporate autonomy and mutual acceptance in relation to one another. The interaction between the party and the armed forces was characterized by true conflict or consensus but rather a mutual inter-penetration of each other (Barany 1991). Theoretically speaking then, Nordlinger's initial penetration model epitomized by Stalin's reign gradually evolved into a much more consolidated liberal model-type exhibited in Western industrial democracies. Unlike the West however, Russian soldiers enjoyed a much greater part of the economic and social pie, a fact that would immediately haunt policy-makers in the Kremlin. While the more flexible and prosperous Western markets could support growing defense spending and taxation, the authoritarian and stagnant Soviet economy could no longer afford to hold the generals in their lap of luxury. One again, political and economic change would result in a major shift in Soviet civil military relations on the Nordlinger continuum.

TABLE TWO
FORMATION OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE (PRE-1989)



FORMATION OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE (Post 1989-1991)



From Currie (1992). Pp. 8,15.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND A MILITARY COUP

When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985, the Soviet Army was a relatively depoliticized and autonomous institution that was less integrated with society and the party when compared to other Communist Armies (48 Zhong 1991). Yet the General Secretary's accession created a new atmosphere for decision-making in matters of defense even with a defiant general staff and defense ministry (Currie 63). The armed forces leadership still recognized the status-quo military doctrine, which the state consented to because the military essentially had a monopoly on the use of force in the highly polarized international environment. The Brezhnev years of increasing military autonomy and professionalization had weakened the CPSU's "penetrating" of the military as an institution. Therefore, the Soviet Army was less involved with domestic political affairs than its counterpart People's Liberation Army in China. But Gorbachev took a new and honest look at the USSR's crumbling economy and set off to do what no one else wanted to do. He began to force open bureaucratic bottlenecks and opened up dialogue with Western policy-makers, often doing so without military consent (Currie 59-60). The Foreign Ministry was given priority for setting arms reductions and did so unilaterally to the dismay of the general staff. Predictably Gorbachev's lack of military experience and hints that he force spending cutbacks even in the privileged armed forces did not draw

compliments from army leaders.). Holloway (1989) calls the shift from a military society, in which society is subservient to the military's needs, to one where the state and military are weakened "demilitarization"(8). This reform-led shift led to a change in total spending on defense outlays in order to free productive capabilities in industry for civilian use (11). According to Zhong (192), Gorbachev's reform or perestroika and its consequences brought about the most drastic changes in civil-military relations since the birth of the Red Army in the early 1920's (51).

Gorbachev showed no inclination to underwrite increased defense spending, and his increasingly radical drive for political liberalization unleashed new forces that challenged the military establishment's social standing and institutional role (Parrott 85). By 1988, the military had become subject to several institutional and procedural changes, the first of which was "military democratization", that is, requiring the army leadership to grant more autonomy to subordinates, decentralizing decision-making processes, and allowing freer exchange of views between officers and soldiers (1992 Zhong 52). Reform minded and often younger officers such as Gareyev began to clash with senior, hard-line officers like Kulikov and when Gorbachev called upon a panel to discuss the possibility of a smaller, volunteer army, senior military officials like Yazov, who appeared to be a reformer, decried such a move would be more expensive than not reforming and destroy the sense of loyalty among the troops (Currie 77). Gorbachev went so far as to relieve several hundred officers from the general staff and criticized them for "old thinking" (103). The new reformist Chief of Staff Moiseyev began to encourage officers to take

initiative and find ways to improve military organization. He called upon senior officers to think long-term and not worry about immediate spending cuts. Moiseyev also demanded better intelligence and analysis from his line units (105-107). The army was opened up to greater outside civilian scrutiny and professional autonomy was called into question. Russian political culture and the prevalent authoritarianism had always emphasized secrecy and an elite monopolization of information.

Indeed glasnost itself had two tracks according to Tsypkin (1991). One track focused on a new view towards arms control and this was reflected in the 1987 signing of the INF Treaty. The second track focused on improving the morale and infrastructure of the military by changing decades-old long practices. Not surprisingly even during the height of glasnost, the armed forces at times provided disinformation to not only the public but the state as well (60). The army was particularly fond of utilizing "show barracks" and other deceptive ploys especially when confronting public scrutiny. The armed forces ignored CFE stipulations on destroying weapons and neglected to inform Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze about toxic chemicals used in Tblisi (58-59). Military whistleblowers did effect some change but more often than not only enraged senior officers and made them question the need to even defend the government. Ironically it was during the late 1980s when the army and security forces were needed the most to reduce separatist violence and protests in regions such as Lithuania. The army found itself in a position where it had to balance national security and reform itself, two countervailing tendencies. By 1990, more Soviet military officers began to participate in

politics, and many ran for electoral office positions in the 1989 Congress of People's Deputies election (53 Zhong 1992). Even in this newly formed government body, politicians criticized the military for stalling on change (Currie 2003). Clearly a shift was occurring from a professionalized, isolated, politically non-participatory objective model to a more actively participating subjective model led to greater confrontation among factions within the armed forces. Nordlinger's models of the latent dynamics of Russian civil-military relations were rapidly demonstrating change. With the opening of the military institution to public scrutiny, several controversies arose that instigated criticism of the armed forces' waning autonomy. Such controversies included *dedovshchina* or the hazing of young recruits and student deferments from military service. These issues further exacerbated the liberal-conservative rift within the services as well as within civilian political organs. Furthermore, ethnic problems within Soviet republican military units, high illiteracy among enlisted recruits, poor officer training and well as an aging higher command added more fuel to the fire (Herspring 1991). Conservatives within the military, and especially High Command Officers, found the criticisms "distasteful" and regarded such views as ill-informed and inspired by anti-military motives even when the criticisms came from other officers (21 Holloway 1989).

By August 1990, Gorbachev began to take notice of the conservative officer backlash and himself began to backtrack on rapid armed forces reform, realizing that he needed a sound military to keep order in the rapidly-deteriorating Soviet Union (Currie 1992). He noted how ordinary soldiers were uncertain whom they must defend. Must

they protect the president, the state, the constitution or the people?

In the meanwhile, regional governments were calling for military protection against Soviet troops and General Yazov, the supposed reformer, had established a counter-commission to head off the reform council (Currie 204-212). The General had tried to present himself as the army's protector and used rhetoric condemning antimilitary sentiment on the periphery (Foye 15). By the end of 1990, a coalition of elite security and armed forces commanders formed that would act with either the active or passive consent of the president and coordinate with conservative elements in the party.

By the fall of 1991, the likelihood of a coup was higher than anytime in Soviet history since the military had never expressed their dissension with the civilian leadership so loudly and so openly (57 Holloway 1989; Zhong, 1992). Reform effects during 1985-1990 had transformed the relatively depoliticized and insulated military establishment into a considerably political and socially interactive institution (65 Zhong 65). The army was forced to rely on bargaining to maintain control over autonomy and "civilianization" or increased civil-military contacts and publicization of military affairs continued to be the trend.

The End of the Civilian Model and the August Coup

Barylski (1992) emphasizes that the end of the Communist Party's monopoly on political representation in 1990 and the eventual neutralization of the Main Political Administration (MPA) within the military radically altered the civil-military relationship (29). In fact, the late Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev likened the party's death as the

equivalent of World War Two in how it affected political unity and stability. The end of the CPSU monopoly also ended the penetration model, which had already been gradually watered down over the past twenty years. Subsequent calls for military reform, as well as draft resistance in several Soviet republics and calls to form republican militias to replace the Soviet Army there, alarmed military officials to the obvious decentralization of Soviet policy-making and control (37 Barylski 1992). There was essentially a broadly-based strengthening of pro-reform forces throughout the Soviet Union and this was embodied in the increasingly autonomous stances taken by republican politicians led by Yeltsin (Foye 16). On August 19, 1991, the eight-member State Emergency Committee (SEC) consisting of the Soviet Minister of Defense Yazov, KGB chief Pugo and others seized Soviet President Gorbachev in a bloodless coup. This was clearly a desperate attempt to prolong the Soviet Union as a political entity and these officials' own corporate positions. Yet the effort was clumsy and unlikely to succeed at best. The State Committee did not receive any support from junior officers and especially enlisted personnel (Foye 17). However, the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who had proclaimed himself the commander-in-chief of the Russian military, security and police forces, declared the State Committee to be criminals (39 Barylski 1992). Rather than risk the threat of civil war, younger officers headed by Alexander Rutskoi escorted Gorbachev to safety. These middle-level officers were the liberal-minded reformers who supported Soviet decentralization and were less inclined to return to the authoritarian one-party rule desired by Yazov and the older officers. Had the Committee operated more effectively

and gracefully, however, more officers might have been sympathetic to it. Instead the main coup players were too slow and too indecisive and had already allowed Yeltsin to garner too much support in the Russian armed forces (Shevtsova 1992). Yet despite the coup failure, many senior officers stated that Grachev and Pugov did not dishonor themselves by arresting Gorbachev but rather did what they felt was in the state's best interests (Foye 17). Additionally the party and state did act in a sufficiently unified manner to capture the confidence of the greater part of the military. This is in contrast to the Beijing Square incident of 1989 where the role of Chinese Communist party unity bound the PLA and encouraged them to act even against civilians (1967 Segal and Phipps 1990). In the Soviet case, the coup reflected a "civil-military" type, that is, a professional, autonomous military that functioned despite the existence of a weak penetrating party. On the other hand, the Chinese case suggests a "party-military" relationship where a stronger, more viable party controlled the armed forces and convinced them to brutally suppress the students. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was also more homogenous and older than the Soviet Party and this consensus pushed the Chinese Army forward.

Yet, Russian armed and security forces never coordinated their efforts and elements of both the KGB and Ministry of Interior (MVD) actively acted against the putsch. Miller (1992) parallels the cleavages in these security organs with those cleavages in the armed forces, which are based on age and seniority within their respective services. The cleavages between the Soviet military/security officers may reflect what Waisbord (1991) calls the generational effect, in which a military generation is defined as a group of

military officers who share a similar political culture (beliefs and values) regarding military, social and political ideas. These ideas are historically grounded in the officers' training processes and cohort experiences (158). In this case, the middle and junior-level officers were clearly more supportive of the Soviet decentralization and opposed to the coup and the generation effect probably still has significant influence in today's Russian armed forces. To what extent this factor will play a significant role in moderating future military relations with Russian politicians remains to be seen.

One other crucial variable explaining the failure of the hard-line coup was the presence of Yeltsin as Russian president. He had appealed to Russian troops in 1991 not to support Gorbachev's efforts in trying to preserve the crumbling Soviet Union (Rahr 10). He then publicly challenged the Soviet president on the legitimacy of the Soviet Union as a whole and the need to eliminate the corrupt and oppressive center apparatus. Yeltsin's final achievement was his Russian presidential victory, which forces Gorbachev to shift his alliances to the leader of the most powerful republic (10). Ironically Yeltsin even graciously offered Gorbachev an opportunity to share office which of course at that point was irrelevant. Thus Yeltsin had co-opted a great number of former-Soviet officers and troops and had a powerful base of support against the coup. What was formerly a unified Soviet government and military was now a disaggregated collection of various national armies and political factions attempting to establish some sort of order.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND A NEWLY-CONSOLIDATING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS MODEL

For over forty years, the Soviet Union and its military institutions provided the basis for a global rivalry with Western democratic forces. Over five million Soviet uniformed personnel, some twenty-even thousand nuclear weapons, fifty-five thousand tanks, over two hundred army divisions and almost three hundred naval surface warships were all at the beck and call of the Communist Party and its militarized society. (Meyer, 1992). Yet by December 1991, crucial bargaining between Soviet President Gorbachev and several republic presidents sealed the fate of the Soviet superpower and various smaller states including the Russian Federation emerged (Colton, 1992). Simultaneously what was the epitome of a penetration model of civil-military relations had disintegrated into roughly fifteen separate systems, each with varying degrees of state and military control. Nordlinger's simple original model had evolved from the point of birth in 1917 to the point of complete change in 1991. What was Soviet became Russian and much history and experience was carried over to the new Yeltsin democratic regime. The post-Soviet military was now but a shadow of its former self, a disembodied spectre (Meyer 114-115). The armed forces had become a fractured, directionless, demoralized and politically disenfranchised institution but remained a viable interest group nevertheless (115). In

addition, the institutional health of the military institution, that is, the measure of an organization's ability to plan and behave as a functional organism, had weakened significantly (115). The new Russian armed forces had to resolve its new institutional environment question, since a new political entity had emerged in Russia, and a redefinition of the military's organizational mission was necessary along with a reestablishment of cohesiveness and morale (117).

The last Soviet Defense Minister, Shaposhnikov, was a true reformer and aware of the times. He struggled to keep several armies in the new Commonwealth of Independent States defensive alliance (Barylski 1998). He also refrained from involving military in political affairs and civilian police matters as much as possible. Yet he struggled to keep ethnically disparate regions together in a pact (219). Surprisingly Shaposhnikov was able to neutralize far-right nationalists seeking to either reform the union or engage in aggression against periphery region. Yet in 1992, it was obvious that the Commonwealth of Independent States as a viable military alliance would not mean that a unified defense force was likely. There would be eleven separate militaries rather than one that could defend several states (215 Papp 1994) (See Table Four)

TABLE FOUR
POSITIONS OF CIS STATES ON SELECTED DEFENSE ISSUES AT 1992
MEETING

Issue	Supporters	Opposed
Honoring CFE and START	All	None
Creating Council of Defense		
Ministers	Russia, Kazakstan, Armenia	Moldova and
three	Uzbekistan, Belarus, Tajikistan	Others
Supplying Troops	Seven Total	Russia, Kazakstan, Tajikistan, Armenia
Personnel legal and social	All	None
Lifeguards		
Definition of General Purpose		
Forces	Eight Total	Azerbaijia, Ukraine,
Moldova		
Status of Strategic Forces	Ten Sign	Kazakstan
Single Defense Budget	Eight Total	Moldova, Ukraine,
Azerbaijia		
Shapashnikov as C-in-C	Nine Total	Turkmenistan,
Moldova		

From Papp (1994). Pp. 215.

In 1993, the competition between President Yeltsin and parliament impaired military operations in several ways. It: 1) led to delays in legal, regulatory and overall policy

clarification 2) it produced confusing signals about how civilian control over military affairs would be exercised 3) it contributed to national economic recession and sharp drops in revenue collection 4) finally, it pushed the armed forces into non-traditional income generating spheres (241). Yeltsin was able to keep the Ministry of Defense loyal to his office and therefore provide an agent for the troops to serve in a time of social chaos. (24). Yet the lack of democratic history prevent the armed forces from either embracing nationalists or communists or pushing for Western-driven economic shock therapy (242). Military officers and security personnel ironically did to coalesce into a loose front called the Union of Officers led by General Terekhov. Some five thousand soldiers of all varieties used patriotism, strong Russian or even Union themes in an effort to attract veterans, Cossacks and security personnel to counter the president's coalition. Luckily for Yeltsin and democrats, the armed forces stayed true to their former selves and never intervened directly, thus affirming its key objective values of the past and most importantly, obeyed Yeltsin (193).

Taking a page from Brezhnev, the president spent monies earmarked for research and development and used them to improve the living conditions of officers (193). Again the importance of budgetary support and corporate autonomy prevailed in the new Russia in much the same way it did thirty years ago. Yeltsin named General Pavel Grachev the new Russian Defense Minister much to the chagrin of other officers including the hero of Moldova, Alexander Lebed. Although clearly corrupt to some degree, Grachev was loyal to Yeltsin and would eliminate any radicals in the army (194).

When the army and police were forced to storm parliament and arrest former reformer Alexander Rutskoi, Yeltsin had come dangerously close to imperiling his own status. He had mistakenly brought in military into a political fight and ruffled many feathers in doing so. Rutskoi's own behavior also set a bad precedent for officers in general. He was overly ambitious and disloyal to his commander-in-chief and this alone was one reason more conservative soldiers sided with the president and assaulted the parliament (264). Perhaps significantly, Yeltsin also promised not to punish troops for any deaths resulting from the fiasco. Yeltsin seemed to be acting more like Stalin would have than a moderate democratic reformer. In 1993, the president signed into law the new constitution and in 1996, he approved the Law of Defense that made him dominant in both domestic and foreign security matters (Barylski 434). He would now directly supervise all agencies that could possibly threaten political stability. Barylski (1998) adds that Yeltsin acted wisely for his own good but could not or would not defer enough authority to his subordinates. Consequently he could not meet the time and energy demands made on himself thus encouraging various power ministries to resolve many of their own problems. Yeltsin was indeed a traditional authoritarian leader of the Soviet variety but could not administer effectively thus allowing the military to fend for itself in matters of budgeting and policy efforts. His leadership style, in fact, resembled a system of personal control over the military, which allowed the military to become a possible instrument for extralegal rule (Blank 1996). This system unfortunately hampered the establishment of a democratic form of civil-military relations because it fomented the

placing of personal and political loyalties of military officers above professional competence and failed to establish institutional channels for civilian control over the military. With his "personalistic" control, Yeltsin undermined professionalism in the armed forces (5 Parrish 1996). Additionally, Yeltsin also used his position as commander-in-chief to convince or compel soldiers to vote for him and, by abolishing the policy of conscription, has appealed to younger voters (Blank, 1996).

The Revival of the Armed Forces as A Special Interest Group

Despite the co-optative abilities, of President Yeltsin, by 1994, the Russian military was once again become a major influence on the future course of both domestic and foreign policies (Odom 1995). The armed forces as a special interest group still maintain and still guides civilian political decision-makers via several issues including military doctrine, military manpower policies, military industrial policy, command and control and military strategy (113). As during the Cold War, the military is able to today justify its still considerable budget by emphasizing security threats and political instability in central Asia and even with the coming NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Ran office representing several parties shows how important the military officer vote may be (*Economist* 1995d p 44). Not surprisingly, Yeltsin has courted military officers and, in doing so, has formed a military bloc within the parliament. Yeltsin also dropped defense minister Pavel Grachev in favor of national hero Alexander Lebed in a cabinet change in an effort to capture military votes (Tarakanov, 1996). Lebed himself expressed a desire to run for a seat in Siberia and won indicates that many Russian citizens still vote on a

feeling of either nationalism or a return to Soviet-type autarchy (*Economist* February, 1998 p 50). Another former officer, General Andrei Nikolaev, also ran and won his seat after positive coverage in the media (*Economist* 1998 p 50). As a whole, fourteen military officers ran for parliamentary seats in the 1995 contest. Many of these officers are not only coming to the defense of the military but they are siding with the large industrial complex in Russian as well (8 Tarakanov 1996). On a more ominous note, the former General that formed the broad-front Soviet Officers' Union in 1992 was found murdered in his home. Lev Rokhlin, known as the reluctant hero of the first Chechen War was shot several times by what authorities claim was a family dispute. However specialists say the killing was done professionally and could have been perpetrated by several enemies or even agents of the state fearful of the General's influence. Roklin had been a supporter of the Gorbachev coup and was a known Yeltsin opponent. (Rogachevskii 2000). What was likely a state-sponsored assassination, the Roklin incident reflects both the insecurity of the political regime to democratic (or authoritarian) opponents and the ease of falling back into Soviet-era political elimination practices.

The Impact of the Chechen War and New Efforts at Military Reform

By January 2000, both the Russian military and civilian leadership was becoming more and more concerned with events in Chechnya where separatists have been waging a campaign against Moscow for several years. Russian troops pacified rebels in 1998 and forced a truce but once again, insurrectionists have accumulated enough weapons and

troops for force the army to return (*Economist* January 2000 p 28). As occurred during the Afghan War from 1979-1988, military officials are hesitant to give accurate figures of Russian casualties. (See Table Five)

TABLE FIVE			
Various Casualty Figures for the 2000 Russian-Chechen Campaign			
According to:	Russia	Chechnya	Soldiers' Mothers
Russians	426	6841	1700+
Chechens	7000	395	na

From *Economist* January 2000. p. 28

By January 2000, President Boris Yeltsin had become so physically and mentally incapacitated that he gradually turned over control of the executive branch (and control of the armed forces) to his Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin. Putin was formerly a middle-level official in the old KGB security organ and is well-hearsed in both foreign and domestic policies (*Economist* January 2000 p 27). Putin was able to maintain his supporters of the armed forces and wealthy industrial elites such as Boris Berezovsky until the general election held in March 2000. Clearly the war in Chechnya was a largest drain on the Russian economy, costing millions and in the meanwhile propagating a public relations nightmare for both the government and the military.

When Putin did when the Russian general election in spring 2000, he inherited the problem-ridden and overbloated government budget from Yeltsin. He faced initially the need to democratize the military institution as a whole just as he needed to instill more solid democratic civilian institutions like a solid judiciary or political parties (70 Ulrich 1999). Because the armed forces tend to change more slowly over time than other institutions in transition, progress in reform is largely dependent on the strength of civilian leaders in charge of oversight (71). In Russian's case, the president is still the lord and master of the military. Despite his knowledge of military and security affairs and despite his institutional power in both the state and Russian society in general, Putin was and still is facing a post-communist military that has been far less receptive to reform. Senior military leaders, in fact, still blame the democratization movement launched by Gorbachev for the loss of military prestige and status and the divergence of societal and military values, along with the destruction of the Soviet Union as a whole (74).

Today's Russian inherited eighty-percent of the Soviet superpower military hardware and nearly half of Soviet territory and population (Ulrich 1999). Yeltsin began the long process of decommissioning many military units, destroying nuclear arms and combining the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Force in the mid to late 1990s (78). Putin as a policy-maker now has to confront the challenge of not only facing new unknown enemies abroad but keeping stability in the Russian military as important as they did decades ago (78). Thus what was once understood and agreed upon by all in Soviet society, the glory and need for the army in a hostile capitalist world, is now no

longer the *sine qua non* of Russian life.

Building Stronger Civilian Institutions

Both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have experienced the difficulties in attempting to reform Russian's adolescent civilian institutions and in the meanwhile, challenging military senior officials to open up their own institution. Russia's first step to too grant the legislature more authority of military matters in order to create more accountability for both the executive and the armed forces (Ulrich 1999). In fact, the Russian Duma has no control over military promotions and only recently, was a civilian defense minister nominated to oversee organization of the major security forces. When one branch of government is permitted to dominate an organization as powerful as the military, corruption and abuse is likely. An example is Russia's first defense minister Pavel Grachev, who as loyal as he was to President Yeltsin, used soldiers as personal workers and housekeepers (84). As a result of declining living conditions in the armed forces, officers and enlisted men are often forced to sell arms and other tools illegally to buyers in Russia and abroad (90-92). Actually such a practice was encouraged by the government in the early 1990s as a way to make easy cash and buy vital goods (Papp 1994). With more oversight by legislative committees and other civilian agencies, military procurement policies can be better observed. As it is, parliamentary oversight over the military is weak due to several reasons. First there is still a lack of civilian expertise in military matters although this situation began to improve as a result of glasnost. Secondly the military tends to force through hurriedly one-page budget requests

worth millions. Such a practice in the United States takes weeks or months of great scrutiny over hundreds of pages of line-item descriptions. Thirdly the executive (not surprisingly) has more information and influence on how much is spent. Finally parliamentary staffers which must gather and present information to their Duma representatives are typically shared, very overworked and often underpaid if they are paid at all (90-92 Ulrich 1999). On the other hand, in the United States defense committee congressmen generally have several aids along with oversight committees and investigatory bodies to assist them in dealing with arms procurement. The organization that should have the most oversight over the armed forces, the National Security Council, is overwhelmed with other larger issues like economic matters and even environmental deterioration. Such broad purviews make constant supervision very difficult and promote greater abuse of government monies (89-90).

In chapter three of his book *Soldiers in Politics*, Nordlinger (1977) defines corporate interests as a broad concern of an organization in its preserving responsibilities in the face of encroachments from rival institutions, and managing and maintaining adequate budgetary support and autonomy in managing internal affairs (65). The military is exceptional in its corporate *esprit de corps* because of its role as defender of all other institutions and the nation as a whole. When outsiders either out of necessity or fear must alter or harm these corporate interests, then the military hierarchy reacts defensively with the matter of reaction dependent on the unity of the organization and the clout of it in government and society. In Russia beginning with Gorbachev (see Chapters Three and

Four), military spending has begun to shrink. In January 1992, President Yeltsin announced that the budget would be cut by ten-percent. In actuality U.S. intelligence sources declared that Russian procurement budgets had fallen by as much as eighty-percent (208 Papp 1994). Yeltsin had announced in 1992 that the government intended to take six-hundred missiles with over one-thousand warheads off alert, dismantle missile launching systems on six additional nuclear submarines, stop production of heavy bombers, halt design and modernization programs in other long-range offensive systems and reduce all weapons purchases by fifty-percent (209). He must also do so during a period of changing societal values as Russians today do not see military service and the need for a superpower-type military.

Clearly Yeltsin had continued Gorbachev's grand scheme of shrinking the armed forces to a more manageable level. Today President Putin still faces some of the obstacles from within the military as his predecessors did. As always, secrecy is the norm with many orders and decrees going unsigned to avoid accountability by both senior and middle-level officers (Ulrich 87). Officers and non-commissioned officers throughout the armed forces guard their "fiefdoms" jealously in an effort to maintain their own power, importance and material interests just as Nordlinger (177) describes.. With the launch of the twenty-five thousand-ton cruiser Peter The Great in 1998, Western observers may observe corporate interests at work even in a era of forced-reform (*Economist* November 1996 p 47). Those also affected in the defense industry by budget cuts have predictably come to the aid of the military fearing for their own losses both financial and political.

Upon considering the military's corporate autonomy during the past several years, one notices more and more outside agents slowly demanding more visibility. It is not only government officials demanding change but those in civil society such as the Committee of Soldiers Mothers, perhaps Russian's most well-known civic organization. It arose during the first Chechen conflict and gained support after it demanded more protection for young enlisted soldiers who were often poorly-trained and ill-equipped for combat (Ulrich 1999). The Chechen campaigns of 1997 and 1999 also mobilized Russia's vibrant media into greater scrutiny of military affairs. News coverage of poor military leadership and the abuse of human rights put the army in an even greater defensive position (See Table Five). One reason that militaries often intervene into politics according to Nordlinger (1977) is a perceived or actual lack of prestige or material goods. Like the situation in the early 1990s, today's officers and enlisted men face decrepit living conditions with little improvement in sight. The example of a naval officer and his family forced to live in a derelict ship in Kaliningrad is one example (Ulrich 1999). The government today, as it was during Gorbachev's glasnost, can little afford to maintain the armed forces nor can it dismantle them without foreign aid. One scholar estimates such a reduction would cost \$70 billion a year (Ulrich 1999). The costs of change are not the only issue of corporate interest for the armed forces. Questions about promotions, recruitment and retention and leadership have arisen. First the problem of cronyism and corruption in rank advancement is still prevalent and a carryover from the Soviet Union. The aforementioned Defense Minister Grachev who used troops as servants is an

egregious case. More often, soldiers are promoted based on ascriptive or personal ties rather than on qualification. Secondly there are not enough qualified officers to fill positions in the navy and army. This is a likely reflection of the poor living conditions already addressed and the slow or even non-existent compensation for service. Even if enough personnel are found, they are often low quality, poorly prepared specimens hardly ready to handle expensive and dangerous equipment. Finally leadership problems are at the forefront in Russia. Along with corruption and abuse, officers often lack a “democratic tradition” and instead rely on fear and intimidation to acquire discipline and order. In 1995, there were four-hundred and twenty three suicides alone, likely as a result of abuse and torture.

Unlike Western armies, which have long histories of qualified non-commissioned officers to link the officer to the field soldier, Soviet units utilized both ideology and fear via the penetration model throughout the twentieth century. On the contrary, those armies based on liberal models utilized more professional and expertise criteria to delineate a clear chain-of-command and responsibility. In other words, Soviet officers never had to answer for their actions under the authoritarian-penetration system and facilitated a “culture of indifference (Ulrich 1999). Thus army leaders must now establish a broad democratic ideology of accountability and a clearer and more open chain-of-command to make enlisted personnel a true part of a professional force rather than an underling to be ordered about and poorly trained. This “broken leadership pattern” must be repaired from the top down and the bottom up before any significant reform of the military can be

carried out. After all, fear and ideology carried much weight in the Soviet Army but in a transitioning democracy, the soldier must want at least the same (if not more) consideration as the man on the street. In a survey of Russian officers, only eleven-percent opined that the public gave them support (147 Ulrich 1999). Clearly military values and the mobilized democratic values of civil society have yet to converge.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: A DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF NORDLINGER'S MODELS OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

Taking from other works in the study of civil-military relations, Nordlinger (1977) devises several simple but theoretically important constructs with his examination of several states in the twentieth-century (see Table Six). This paper argues that these constructs or models, however parsimonious and elegant, must be modified to fit in a larger, more dynamic temporal process. This paper has endeavored to do so by re-examining both the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence of the past fifty years of Russian existence. Nordlinger devised his penetration model by using the example of Stalin's Soviet Union of 1930-1953. The totalitarian model of this era saw the use of heavy repression via military dismissals, arrests, imprisonment and even execution on a large scale. Never before had a government so forcefully captured a modern military establishment. Stalin also increased the use of political ideology and supervision. He increased the use of commissars and secret police surveillance. Despite this intrusion into the armed forces' corporate autonomy, the Red army was able to withstand and defeat invading German forces in the early 1940s. Nordlinger's cursory examination of the Soviet penetration model neglects to mention the effects of the Russian Civil War and the subsequent need to reform elements of the Bolshevik army. Under Trotsky, Stalin's mortal enemy, the army was already beginning to form a professional, corporate infrastructure and relative expertise in the use of the most up-to-date arms. Stalin's

intrusion in the military's evolution set the army back some years and then propelled it ahead a decade in the use of doctrine, strategy and tactics in a war against its opposition, the best land army in the world in the Wehrmacht. By the end of World War Two, Stalin had helped defeat Germany and maintained control of the armed forces through intimidation and a cult of personality, two traits often associated with less-developed societies and state institutions.

When Khrushchev took control of the party apparatus in 1953, he set in motion event that would alter the armed forces vis-à-vis the party and state. The general secretary had ascended to power by using the army as an ally. He now treated it as more of a younger, bigger brother by keeping it happy but under watch. When Khrushchev became so erratic to threaten the foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet military-industrial complex, the army assisted in his removal in favor of a more conservative, predictable leader in Brezhnev. With him and the era of détente with the United States, the armed forces could make political inroads into the foreign policy-making arena. Thus the military had evolved into a more traditional interest group of the Western variety. The armed forces along with weapons industries continued to take a great portion of the Soviet economy's wealth at the expense of the domestic consumption sector. When Mikhail Gorbachev was named general secretary in 1985, his reform and openness policies began to not only mobilize the citizenry against the inefficient and centrist Soviet state but also question the need for a huge and costly military that is used to repress regionalist sentiment. Soviet civil society combined with the reformist calls of the only man who could order the

shakedown of both the state and the armed forces.

With the August 1991 Coup against Gorbachev, the highest elite of the security apparatus attempted to forestall the state disintegration that was occurring and reinforce the old status quo of a world superpower. Instead the coup-plotters themselves were arrested because of the lateness of their actions and the lack of unity among the soldiers who had conflicting loyalties to the president, the party, the region where they served and even the people on the street. The Soviet Union was suffering from a legitimacy deflation of the worst type. The problem for the military was that it too unraveled along with the state. Unlike other national crises where smaller more unified states become socially and economically unstable enough to encourage the army to step in and regain order, the Soviet Union was unique in that it was a conglomeration of many states bound together by what was in 1991 a defunct ideology and a resource-strapped military. Yazov's desperate coup pushed the army into a place it had never been in the existence of the Soviet Union. His arrest, although not supported by the bulk of the armed forces, made the army a very brief guardian-type actor. In other words, as Nordlinger would have put it, the State Emergency Committee sought to preserve the status quo and regain government control. Thus the Soviet military (or a portion of it) for a shining moment instigated a praetorian regime.

After the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Soviet military again evolved or spawned fifteen separate armed forces. The Russians kept the bulk of manpower and equipment and military leaders were literally forced to continue their

demobilization due to a lack of monies and public support. Where the military and its industrial complex once dominated Russian civilian policy-makers in the 1960-1970s, it was now relegated to selling arms for food. The military in twenty-first-century Russia is only a pale imitation of what it once was. It still serves as a strong influence of civilian policy-makers but it realizes that it has no alternative but to going along with the weak reform and democratization movements preeminent in civilian society. Unlike militaries in South America in the 1960s which could act in unity and oust a politically-unstable regime, the Russian armed forces have had the handicap of being so large and disparate that they cannot truly take the government over *in toto*. Russian soldiers have a superpower legacy and a history of non-intervention. They have generally influenced citizens politically when individual officers spout nationalistic rhetoric and mobilize in the same type of civic groups that democratic and liberal politicians do. So it is not in the Russian armed forces' heritage to initiate palace coups. Heeding the president and/or a nascent constitution to them is not so different from taking orders from the party secretary. But the military has still had to roll with the times, especially the last ten years just the Russia's other institutions have. The armed forces will still remain important as a social actor in a slowly consolidating democracy and must continue to adjust as best it can. It can still serve the people and the nation, modernize and remain a powerful regional force to serve to facilitate stability in a time of great instability in world politics. Russia as a whole and its men and women in uniform must however mature quickly and adapt to the rest of the developed world where it belongs.

As a whole, the Russia's military has evolved over fifty years from what was initially a weak penetration relationship vis-a-vis the state to a strong penetration-totalitarian model under Stalin. Khrushchev and later Brezhnev facilitated a corporate expansion of professionalism and power in relation to the party and civil society over thirty years. The military would exist in a weak liberal model relationship having its corporate autonomy and monopoly of force. From 1985 until 1991, the state began to chip away at military corporate autonomy much to the chagrin of senior leaders like General Yazov. The Russian model shifted rapidly from a weak penetration model in 1990 to a brief guardian regime with the Gorbachev arrest. From 1992 until the present, the military has existed in an uneasy liberal model, at times leaning towards moderator or back the other direction towards a traditional model (See Table Seven). What remains in store for Russia is uncertain at this time. Unlike decades ago, Russian policy-makers have much greater ties to Western political leaders and perhaps more importantly their money. One way or another, the armed forces will continue to serve Russian society only they will have to do so without the prestige and resources of years past. They will maintain their honor and glory if they serve as they did in the past. They remain a powerful interest group and influence politics indirectly much the same way they did four decades ago. Yet if they choose another path and endeavor to change efforts at continued democratization via direct intervention, they will not only lose their hallowed status as defender of the nation but their *raison d'être* for the past fifty years as well.


TABLE SIX
NORDLINGER'S MODELS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Civilian Regimes			Military Regimes		
Penetration	Traditional	Liberal	Moderator	Guardian	Ruler
Ideology and Military	Absence of	Differentiation	Military veto	Control	
Integration w/	differences	of Elites	Power	of State	
Dominant					
Civilians Political +	w/ civilians	Military autonomy	Preserve Status	Preserve	
Economic			Quo	Status Quo	
No separate Change	Similar values	Military expertise			
Military		Military separate			
Autonomy		From Government			

From Nordlinger (1977). Pp.10-29.

TABLE SEVEN

THE DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN CIVIL-MILITARY DEVELOPMENT



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